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Employment Generation and Poverty Alleviation 
in Developing Economies 
Gary S. Fields 
We know well that the East Asian economies have achieved higher economic 
growth rates than those in any other region of the world1 and that production for 
world markets has featured as a hallmark of the East Asian successes. This paper has 
three purposes: first, to present comparative data showing that the rates at which 
employment opportunities improve and poverty is reduced mirror countries' differential 
growth experiences; second, to examine differences in labour market institutions, 
demonstrating that those in East Asia have similarities more likely to lead to higher 
output performance and shared improvements in living conditions; and third, to present 
a model analysing the synergy between countries' choices of trade and labour market 
policies. 
The Comparative Record 
Table 1 displays changing labour market conditions in a number of East Asian 
and Latin American economies. The extraordinary improvements in employment 
conditions that have taken place in the East Asian economies stand out. Consistent 
with the famous model of Lewis (1954) and Fei and Ranis (1964), the data for each 
economy exhibit two phases: i) falling unemployment with at best modest increases 
in real earnings levels, followed by ii) essentially full employment with rapidly rising 
real earnings. The earnings increases are quite remarkable: real earnings increased by 
a factor of four in Hong Kong in 30 years, by a factor of six in Korea in 25 years, and 
by a factor of eight in Chinese Taipei in 30 years — in each case, with unemployment 
rates in the 2-4 per cent range2. 
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Table 1. Changing Wages and Unemployment in East Asia and Latin America 
(Index numbers and percentages) 
Year 
1948 
1960/61 
1965 
1970/71 
1975/76 
1980 
1985 
1990 
Year 
1963 
1966/67 
1971/72 
1976 
1980/81 
1986 
1990 
Year 
1966 
1975 
1980 
1985 
1990 
Year 
1954 
1960 
1970 
1979 
1985 
1990 
East Asia 
Hong Kong 
Index of Real Wages 
100 
105 
157 
167 
194 
253 
301 
405 
Korea 
Index of Real Earnings 
n.a. 
100 
169 
n.a. 
306 
421 
660 
Singapore 
Index of Average Real 
Monthly Income per 
Worker 
100 
100 
120 
176 
216 
Chinese Taipei 
Index of Real 
Manufacturing 
Earnings 
100 
102 
183 
400 
518 
810 
Unemployment 
n.a. 
1.7 
n.a. 
4.4 
4.3 
3.7 
3.8 
1.7 
Unemployment 
8.2 
6.2 
4.5 
3.9 
4.1 
3.8 
2.4 
Unemployment 
9.1 (1965) 
4.8 (1977) 
3.5 
4.1 
2 
Unemployment 
6.3(1955) 
4.3 (1963) 
1.5 (1972) 
1.3(1981) 
2.9 
1.7 
Year 
1980 
1985 
1987 
Year 
1978 
1984 
1990 
Year 
1980 
1984 
1990 
Year 
1981 
1983 
1989 
Year 
1976 
1979 
1982 
1986 
Year 
1977 
1980 
1984 
1988 
1992 
Latin America 
Bolivia 
Index of Real Wages 
181.8 
100 
76.4 
Chile 
Index of Real Wages 
82 
100 
105.2 
Mexico 
Index of Real Wages 
129.4 
100 
103.3 
Brazil 
Index of Real Earnings 
100 
60.3 
68.3 
Costa Rica 
Index of Average 
Monthly Income 
79.4 
104.2 
60.2 
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Venezuela 
Index of Real Earnings 
89.8 
100 
68 
61.9 
47.4 
Unemployment 
7.5 
5.7 
5.9 
Unemployment 
14 
14 
6 
Unemployment 
4.7 
5.6 
2.8 
Unemployment 
4.3 
4.9 
3 
Unemployment 
6.2 
4.8 
9.4 
6.2 
Unemployment 
4.6 
5.7 
13.4 
6.9 
7.1 
Sources: For Hong Kong, Korea, Singapore and Chinese Taipei: Asian Development Bank (1994). 
For Bolivia, Chile, and Mexico: World Bank (1995). 
For Brazil, Costa Rica, and Venezuela: Fields and Newton (1997). 
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Critics of the East Asian model of economic growth sometimes point to labour 
repression, the so-called "dark underside" of the East Asian miracle3. Yet despite the 
repressive measures that were sometimes in effect (and still are in some cases), labour 
participated fully in the rapid economic growth that took place. Table 2 compares the 
growth in real per capita national income with that of real earnings. In Hong Kong, 
Korea and Singapore, national income and labour earnings grew at essentially the 
same rate, while in Chinese Taipei earnings grew even faster than national income. 
Far from being left behind, workers in East Asia shared proportionately in their countries' 
exceptionally fast growth. 
Table 2. Growth in National Income and Earnings in Four Newly Industrialising Economies 
in East Asia, 1980-90 
(Percentages) 
Economy 
Hong Kong 
Korea 
Singapore 
Chinese Taipei 
Growth in Real GNP or GDP per capita 
64.2 
121.8 
77.5 
88.0 
Growth in Real Earnings 
60.0 
115.8 
79.8 
102.7 
Source: Fields (1994), Table 1. 
Shared growth of so large a magnitude should produce a reduction in poverty 
rates. Data using country-specific poverty lines since 1980 show that this is indeed 
the case. In Chinese Taipei, the poverty rate (gauged by the poverty headcount ratio) 
fell from 47 per cent in 1980 to 15 per cent in 1992 (source: author's calculations 
from data in Republic of China, Statistical Yearbook of the Republic of China, various 
years). In Korea, the percentage of workers below a constant real low earnings line 
was 62.6 per cent in 1980 and just 10.3 per cent in 1991 (Yoo, 1995). The poverty 
rate fell over a five-year period from 28.5 per cent to 18.3 per cent in Hong Kong 
and from 31.2 per cent to 26.1 per cent in Singapore (Fields, 1994). 
During the last several years, the United Nations has made extensive use of a 
measure which combines countries' records on education, life expectancy, and national 
income into a single Human Development Index (HDI). Table 3 presents these data 
for various regions of the world and for the newly industrialising economies of East 
Asia (excluding Chinese Taipei, which the United Nations refuses to recognise). These 
data show i) the increases in the HDI were 50-100 per cent greater in the Asian NIEs 
than in the world as a whole and, consequently ii) the HDI levels attained by Hong 
Kong, Korea, and Singapore place them on a par with the industrial countries. 
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Table 3. Levels and Changes in United Nations Human Development Index 
Various country aggregates: 
All developing countries 
Least developed countries 
Industrial countries 
World 
East Asian NIEs: 
Hong Kong 
Singapore 
Korea 
Level, 1960 
0.260 
0.165 
0.799 
0.392 
0.561 
0.519 
0.398 
Level, 1992 
0.541 
0.307 
0.918 
0.605 
0.875 
0.836 
0.859 
Change, 1960-1992 
0.281 
0.142 
0.119 
0.213 
0.314 
0.317 
0.461 
Source: United Nations (1994), Table 5.5 and Annex Table A5.3. 
By contrast, Latin America has a quite dismal record, not only absolutely but 
relative to East Asia, with the 1980s correctly characterised as the "lost decade" in that 
region. Macroeconomic growth was essentially nil: the region's economies grew by 
just 0.9 per cent per year in the 1980s, but after adjusting for population increases, 
real per capita GDP fell by 1.2 per cent per year (Inter-American Development Bank, 
1991, Table B-l). The lack of macroeconomic growth in some Latin American countries 
and the actual worsening of economic conditions in others manifested itself at times 
in disturbingly high unemployment rates (14 per cent in Chile, 13 per cent in Venezuela) 
and at other times in shocking declines in real wages or earnings (20 per cent in 
Mexico, 32 per cent in Brazil, 47 per cent in Venezuela, and 58 per cent in Bolivia). 
Poverty stagnated or worsened under such conditions: poverty rates doubled in 
Venezuela, stagnated in Colombia and Brazil, and fell modestly in Costa Rica (Morley, 
1994, Table 6). 
In sum, labour market conditions improved and poverty fell sharply in East 
Asia, while the opposite held true for Latin America, principally, of course, because 
the East Asian economies grew much more rapidly. While many reasons have been 
cited for this differential growth experience — see, for instance, the World Bank's 
"East Asian miracle" study (1993) and various critiques of it4 — the balance of this 
paper focuses on one particular factor, namely the workings of the labour market. The 
following section presents and analyses ways in which the labour market institutions 
in East Asia differ from those in most other regions of the world, while the third 
section presents a model showing how a country's labour market and trade regimes 
may interact with one another to affect possibilities for economic development. 
94 
Differences in Labour Market Institutions 
Empirical Differences 
In general, East Asian wages reflect to a much greater degree than those in other 
regions of the developing world the forces of supply and demand in labour markets. 
Consider the following: 
Minimum wages aim to assure workers an "adequate" standard of living. Long 
on the books throughout most of the developing world (Starr, 1981), they have little 
importance in East Asia. Korea introduced a minimum wage system only in 1988 and 
has set the minimum wage level so that it proves to be a binding constraint for only a 
small fraction of Korean workers (Park, 1992). Although Chinese Taipei has had a 
minimum wage law in force for decades, no company has ever been fined for violating 
the law (Chang, 1989). 
Trade unions are often encouraged by government policy as a means of entitling 
workers to a "just" share of the fruits of their labour. Unions have raised the wages of 
their members by as much as 150 per cent in Jamaica, 31 per cent in Ghana, 24 per 
cent in South Africa, and 20 per cent in Malaysia (Tidrick, 1975; World Bank, 1995, 
Table 12.2). By contrast, in Korea and Chinese Taipei, unions are repressed and the 
union wage premium is at most 2-3 per cent (Lin, 1989; Park, 1991; Yoo, 1995). 
Public sector pay policies often result in substantially higher wages for 
government workers than for their private sector counterparts. Costa Rica exemplifies 
this and as a result, "everybody" in Costa Rica tries to work for the government 
(Gindling, 1991). In East Asia, the public sector pays what is needed to compete with 
the private sector — neither more nor less. 
Multinational corporations sometimes pay above-market wages in sub-Saharan 
Africa and elsewhere (Berg, 1969). Although this occurs partly for efficiency wage 
reasons (Stiglitz, 1974, 1976), it also happens because some governments have 
"encouraged" them to do so by not so subtly threatening expulsion or expropriation if 
they do not. In Korea and other East Asian countries, wages and working conditions 
are the same in foreign and domestic firms (ILG, 1996). 
Finally, labour codes may regulate hiring and firing, impose payroll taxes on 
firms and mandate that employers provide certain benefits to their workers. Panama 
had such a labour code, which raised labour costs by an estimated 90 per cent 
(Spinanger, 1985) before it was finally abandoned as unsustainable. Likewise, Bolivian 
employment legislation raises labour costs by an estimated 90-110 per cent 
(Bravo, 1995). Companies in India and Zimbabwe may not dismiss workers, resulting 
in artificially high employment levels and artificially low economic efficiency (Fallon 
and Lucas, 1991, 1993). In East Asia, employers also face labour codes (for instance, 
severance payments must be made to laid-off workers), but with very much lower 
costs. 
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These labour market interventions, aimed at raising earnings and reducing poverty, 
mean well and do indeed benefit workers fortunate enough to work in covered sectors 
of the economy. Nevertheless, they appear to have had adverse employment and 
efficiency effects and to have contributed to the informalisation of the economy, as 
employers evaded the regulations by not engaging workers as regular employees or 
by not even appearing as official companies (De Soto, 1989). 
It is an empirical question as to which worked better to raise workers' standards 
of living and thereby reduce poverty: the direct approach (pushing wages and benefits 
up through public policy intervention) or the indirect approach (fostering economic 
growth of a type that would cause wages and other benefits to be pulled up by the 
forces of supply and demand in labour markets). Judging from the record, the indirect 
approach may have something to commend it. Economic theory suggests that this 
pattern is by no means accidental. Several heuristic models can show it. 
Theoretical Explanations 
The three models that follow demonstrate how market wage determination should 
lead to higher levels of economic activity than wage levels set artificially above or 
below the market-clearing level. Model 1 consists of a labour market with a single 
common wage. As depicted in Figure 1, given an upward-sloping labour supply 
curve (S) and a downward-sloping labour demand curve (D), W* denotes the market-
clearing wage and L* the market-clearing employment level. 
W 
Figure 1. Non-market Clearing Wages Reduce Employment 
S 
W* 
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Consider what would happen if the wage were to be set anywhere above W*. 
Employers would move up their labour demand curves and employment would fall. 
Accordingly, less output would be produced and the economy would operate at a sub-
optimal level. While the dynamics would have to be fully worked out, it is likely that 
the economic growth rate in such an economy would be lower as well. 
The hazards of a wage higher than one which clears the market are well understood 
in East Asia. Less well appreciated are those of a wage below the market-clearing 
level, such as Singapore tried for a number of years in the 1970s5. Any wage rate 
below W* would cause employers to want to move down their labour demand curves 
and workers to move down their labour supply curves. Labour supply, of course, 
provides the binding constraint: fewer workers appear than employers want to hire at 
such wages. With less labour supplied, there is less employment, hence less output, 
hence slower economic growth. 
This analysis shows that in a single labour market model, the wage level which 
clears the market maximises employment and hence output. The E = f(W) locus in 
Figure 1 shows that the further the wage is from the market-clearing level W*, the 
further is employment from the maximum possible (E*). The limited role of segmenting 
factors in East Asian labour markets may furnish part of the explanation for why their 
growth rates and employment levels have been so high for so long. 
Model 2 resembles Model 1 except that the minimum wage covers only part of 
the economy. In this model, some sectors face a minimum wage or other institutional 
wage-setting force and some do not. As shown in Figure 2, the higher wage in the 
covered sectors than in the non-covered sectors implies that the covered sectors face 
unlimited supplies of labour within the relevant range. The higher the minimum wage 
in the covered sectors, the smaller will be employment there. Assuming that workers 
not employed in the covered sectors take up employment in the non-covered sectors, 
an increase in the minimum wage in the covered sectors will increase the crowding of 
labour into the non-covered sectors6. This crowding results not only in lower wages 
in the non-covered sectors but also in greater dead-weight losses a la Harberger, and 
therefore lower aggregate output. 
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Figure 2. In a Crowding Model, a Higher Wage in Sector A 
Reduces Employment in That Sector, Crowds Workers 
into Sector B and Lowers the Sector B Wage 
Labour Market Consequence of Crowding Workers Out of Sector A 
Labour Market Consequence of Crowding Workers into Sector B 
W S„ 
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Model 3 offers a happier scenario. It shows how economic growth in one part of 
an economy leads to higher wages for all workers. Suppose for ease of analysis that 
the economy has two sectors, here termed "manufacturing" and "agriculture", and 
that the labour market is integrated in the sense that the same wage prevails in both 
sectors for a given type of worker — a realistic enough stylisation of the East Asian 
situation. Figure 3 depicts what happens when economic growth takes place in one 
sector, manufacturing. The original demand for labour curve in the manufacturing 
sector (DM) is downward-sloping relative to origin OM ; likewise, the original demand 
for labour curve in the agricultural sector (DA) is downward-sloping relative to origin 
0A . The distance 0 M 0 A represents the total labour supply. If the standard equilibrating 
forces in labour markets operate freely, as in East Asia, wages would equalise across 
the two sectors at level W* (=WM). At this wage, O M E workers would be demanded in 
the manufacturing sector, 0AE workers in the agricultural sector, and total labour 
demand in the two sectors combined would exactly equal the total labour supplied in 
the economy. 
Figure 3. In an Integrated Labour Market, Growth in One Sector 
Raises Wages in All Sectors 
W 
w 
oM 
DA 
^ D M 
-WA 
wA 
o. 
E' 
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Now suppose that economic growth takes place in the manufacturing sector. 
Because manufacturing firms need more workers to produce the extra output, the 
labour demand curve in the manufacturing sector shifts rightward to DM'. Assuming 
no change in the agricultural product market, agricultural employers' demand for 
labour curve would remain stationary at DA. The labour market is now in disequilibrium 
because at the original wage W* more labour is demanded than supplied. To resolve 
this disequilibrium, manufacturing employers raise wages to retain existing workers 
and attract new ones, and agricultural employers raise wages to prevent all their workers 
from leaving. The labour market then equilibrates at a new common wage W > W*. 
Because of the sector-specific shift in labour demand, the manufacturing sector has 
more workers than before (0ME' rather than 0ME) and agriculture fewer ( O A E ' rather 
than 0AE). 
This analysis identifies three groups of workers: i) those who had been working 
in manufacturing and now earn higher wages than before; ii) those drawn by higher 
wages into manufacturing from agriculture; and Hi) those who remain in agriculture 
and earn more than previously. In this way, economic growth in a country's export 
sector can benefit all workers: those who produce manufactured goods and those who 
produce agricultural goods. 
East Asia, of course, produces manufactured goods largely for export, but not 
agricultural goods. The preceding discussion therefore suggests the possibility that 
market wage determination may facilitate not only widespread earnings gains for a 
country's people but expansion of exports and hence economic growth as well. The 
next model shows how trade policy and labour market policy may interact with each 
other in precisely this way. 
A Model of Interactions between Trade Policy and Labour Market Policy 
Policy Options 
Assume an economy with two goods: a domestic good D and an export good X. 
Self-employed producers make the domestic good. The export good may or may not 
be produced in positive quantity but if it is, production occurs in an export firm 
facing increasing marginal costs. 
Suppose the economy is controlled by a "planner" who can choose the country's 
trade policy (7). Let there be two trade policy options: 
i) T=X: In this case, the planner adopts a policy of export promotion. He has many 
possible ways of doing this — by adjusting exchange rates, tariffs, taxes, or 
subsidies. The specific policy option considered here creates the resources to 
enable exports, for example by building a harbour, constructing an export-
processing zone or opening a commercial office abroad. In the model below, 
T=X is a necessary condition for exporting; it could not take place, for instance, 
without a harbour. 
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ii) T=~X: In this case, the planner elects not to promote exports. He may do this by 
not developing domestic infrastructure, by imposing a prohibitive export duty, 
or by creating bad external relations. Regardless of the method chosen, T=~X 
implies no export activity. 
The planner makes his choice under two alternative labour market regimes: 
a) L=M: In this case, the planner faces market-determined wages. Hence, the wages 
in the two sectors, Wx and WD, are equal. 
Production costs are lower under L=M than under: 
b) L=~M: In this regime, the planner faces non-market-determined wages in the 
export sector, hence a dualistic wage structure, for reasons such as those 
considered in the section above. 
This model asks the question: using the national income criterion, how do the 
two trade policies (export promotion or its absence) compare in the two labour market 
regimes (market or non-market wages)? As developed below it demonstrates the 
possibility that export promotion is superior to inaction when wages in the export 
sector are market-determined but not when they are above market-clearing levels. 
Specific Relationships of the Model 
Production Functions 
Output in the domestic sector (D) is produced with one input, labour, according 
to the relation QD=qDLD. This is a constant returns technology, as might pertain to a 
land-abundant economy in which anyone who wishes to till the land may do so and 
grow qD units of crop per period. 
The export sector (X) uses two inputs: labour (Lx) and an intermediate good (7). 
Write the production function as Qx=f(Lx)I. Regarding the / component, labour is 
assumed to be essential to production, and its output is subject to diminishing returns: 
/ ' > 0, / "< 0, /(0) = 0. The intermediate good (e.g. a harbour) also is essential to 
export production; 7=1 if it is available, 7=0 otherwise. 
Product Prices 
The domestic sector's product price is normalised to equal 1. In the export sector, 
assume the country is small in the world economy, so that the world market determines 
the product price (neglecting transport costs). Denote this price by Px. 
Wages 
The wage in the domestic sector, WD, equals average product, which also equals 
marginal product qD. This wage is market-determined and, in a self-employment 
economy, clears the market. 
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The wage in the export sector, Wx, depends on the labour market regime. Under 
the regime of market-determined wages {L=M), Wx= WD. In the non-market regime 
(L=~M), Wx is set rigidly at a level j y x > WD • 
Employment and Unemployment 
The total labour force f, is the sum of export sector employment (Lx), domestic sector 
employment (LD) and unemployment (Lv). The employer in the export sector pays a 
wage at least as high as in the domestic sector. At that wage, he faces an unlimited 
supply of labour. He demands labour until the point where value of marginal product 
equals the wage, f\Lx)Px = Wx, provided the two can in fact be equated at some 
positive employment level. The division of the labour force between domestic goods 
production and unemployment is analysed below. 
Fixed Costs of Exporting and the Intermediate Good 
The choice of an export-oriented trade policy obligates the planner to provide 
an intermediate good (/) such as a harbour essential to export production. The 
intermediate good, /, is a quasi-fixed cost of exporting in the sense that the cost of 
producing it, F, is incurred if the export-oriented trade strategy (T=X) is adopted, but 
the cost may be avoided if it is decided not to export (T=~X). 
The Social Profitability of Exporting 
Exporting is socially profitable if it generates revenue in excess of costs. Revenue 
equals PxQr The costs are the direct costs F and the foregone output from the domestic 
sector, qD (Lx + Lv). Hence, exporting is socially profitable if the following expression 
is strictly positive: 
l> = PxQx-F-qD{Lx + Lv) (1) 
The Private Profitability of Exporting 
For the export firm to operate, it must earn a profit, K. Therefore its revenues 
must at least equal its expenditures, i.e. private profits 
n = PxQx-WxLx (2) 
must be non-negative. The firm will earn zero profits if it decides not to produce, 
which would occur when either: 
a) its profit would be negative for any positive output level, or 
b) the planner decides not to promote exports, and therefore some essential 
input like a harbour is not provided to the export firm. 
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Relationship between Social and Private Profitability 
From (1) and (2), 
^^(WX'-WD)LX + K-WDLV-F (3) 
i.e. the social profitability of exporting is equal to the increased wages received by 
employed labour, plus the profit earned by the exporter, minus the loss in wages of 
any labour that may become unemployed, minus the fixed cost of exporting borne by 
the planning authority. 
Results under Alternative Market Closure Rules 
Consider first the social profitability of export promotion in the case where 
wages in the export sector are market-determined (L=M). In this case, WX=WD and 
there will be no unemployment. Substituting WX=WD and Lv=0 into (3), we find that 
for any F>0, under L=M, a necessary (but not sufficient) condition for socially profitable 
exporting is that n be greater than zero, i.e. that there be a privately profitable pair 
(L r Qx). Assume that there exists at least one such pair7. Denote the maximum profit 
under market wage determination by n* and the corresponding employment and output 
levels by L*x and Q*x. Then, when L=M, export promotion will increase GNP if F < n*: 
F<TC=$(T = X,L = M) yGNP (T = ~X) (4) 
Consider the alternative labour market regime whereby wages in the export 
sector are set at non-market clearing levels (L=~M). Suppose that the minimum wage 
is set below the first worker's value of marginal product but above the wage in the 
domestic goods sector, Pxf'x (0) > \y x > WD. The next two models analyse this case, 
for efficient on-the-job search (Model 4) and inefficient on-the-job search (Model 5). 
In both of these models, export promotion is advantageous under market-clearing 
wages but not under non-market clearing wages. 
Model 4: Assume there is efficient on-the-job search, i.e. any worker not 
employed in the high-wage export sector can search equally well while at work in the 
domestic goods sector at the lower wage WD or while unemployed (Fields, 1975). No 
one would search while unemployed under such conditions. Suppose that some positive 
production level remains privately profitable under the minimum wage j y x . Let 
Lx'Q ' anc* ft denote the profit-maximising levels of employment, output, and 
profit in the export sector under y/x . By (3), when Lu - 0, the social profitability of 
exporting under non-market wage determination, £ , is 
I- ft +(Wx-WD)~Lx-F (5) 
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If F is sufficiently large, the social profitability of exports, P , can be negative even 
though exports are privately profitable (i.e. ^ > 0). This occurs if 
P > n + (Wx ~ ^i) L ' ^ e m e r e f ° r e arrive at the condition: 
F<~K +(Wx-WJ~Lx=>(T=X,L = ~M)*GflP(T=~X) (6) 
Conditions (4) and (6) together give us a GNP ranking for Model 4: 
7 t * > F > ~ +(WX-WD) ~Lx=*(T=X,L = M)>GNpT = ~X^GNp(T = X,L = ~M) 
(7) 
which states that the fixed cost of exporting must be small enough that it can be 
outweighed by private profitability in the market wage case, yet large enough to 
overcome private profitability and wage gain in the non-market wage case. Any set of 
parameters satisfying these requirements would have the property that an export 
orientation would raise GNP if wages are market-determined but not if they are set 
above market-clearing levels. 
The interpretation of condition (7) is aided by subtracting F from each term on 
the left-hand side and writing the result as: 
5*(G\)>0>£ CQX) (V) 
with Q*x and n denoting the profit-maximising levels of export production under 
market wage determination and non-market wage determination respectively and £* 
and £ the corresponding levels of social profit. Q\ is greater than Q , because the 
marginal cost curve of the export firm has shifted up when wages are above market-
clearing levels, implying that some output units that would have been profitable under 
WX=WD are not profitable under \yx>WD. Figure 4 illustrates this. Revenue (PXQX) 
moves accordingly. Condition (7') then says that the export revenue generated by the 
relatively high export volume under market wage determination is sufficient to cover 
the costs of promoting the export industry, but the revenue generated by the relatively 
low export volume under non-market wage determination is not. 
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Figure 4. Export Volume under Market and 
Non-market Wage Determination 
Price 
Quantity 
' = Market wage determination 
' = Non-market wage determination 
Model 5: This model differs from Model 4 in that it replaces the efficient on-
the-job search assumption by the Harris-Todaro (1970) assumption that to get a job 
in the export sector, one must migrate there. Equations (l)-(4) hold as before; the 
others must be replaced. In this model, the equilibrium allocation of the labour force 
between sectors is given by the Harris-Todaro equilibrium condition 
WXLX/(LX + LV) = WD (8) 
wherein the expected wage in the export sector (the wage if employed multiplied by 
the ratio of jobs to job seekers) equals the expected wage in the domestic goods sector. 
Substituting (8) into (3), we obtain the social profitability of exporting in Model 5: 
4 = 7C-F (9) 
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[No terms involving wage gains appear in (9), because the increase in wage bill among 
those employed is exactly offset by the loss in wage bill due to induced unemployment.] 
Hence, the condition for exports to be socially unprofitable under non-market wage 
determination becomes 
F < ~K =i(T = X,L = ~M) >GNp (T = ~X) (10) 
in Model 5 and the rank reversal condition becomes 
7t* > F>~K => (T = X, L = M) yGNpT=~XyGNp(T = X, L = ~M) (11) 
In summary, the models in this section have observed the possibility that: 
i) A policy of export promotion (i.e. spending public funds to subsidise the private 
sector) produces higher GNP than an inward-looking trade strategy when wages 
in the export sector are market-determined. 
However: 
ii) The ranking reverses when wages in the export sector are set institutionally 
above market levels: the inward-looking trade strategy produces higher GNP 
than an export-oriented trade strategy under wages not market-determined. 
Therefore: 
iii) Whether an export-oriented trade strategy raises GNP or lowers it depends in 
part on the labour market regime within which trade policy is chosen. 
This analysis demonstrates that the labour market regime might cause a reversal 
of trade policy, but not that it necessarily will do so. 
Not to be able to export profitably is bad. To export unprofitably is worse. 
Policy Conclusions 
The first part of this paper reviewed the employment-generation and poverty-
reduction records of newly emerging economies in various parts of the world. It 
observed a pronounced contrast between the remarkably rapid reductions in poverty 
and improvements in labour market conditions that have taken place in East Asia and 
the distressing lack of progress in Latin America. Of course, the East Asian countries 
achieved high economic growth while Latin America has had much more limited, and 
in some cases even negative growth. High growth causes improvements in labour 
market conditions and reductions in poverty, and for this reason it should be sought. 
Those who avoid it because they believe that it increases the misery of the poor are 
simply wrong. 
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The second section of the paper then compared the labour market institutions in 
East Asia with those in other developing regions. While most countries in Latin America 
and elsewhere have tried to reduce poverty and improve labour market conditions by 
directly pushing labour market conditions up, East Asia followed a much more indirect 
approach, relying on growth to pull conditions up. The models showed how wages 
above market-clearing levels might reduce both employment and output and, 
contrariwise, how, with market wage determination, all of a country's workers might 
share in the rapid growth that takes place. These data and analytical models suggest 
that the indirect approach to raising labour standards was the more fruitful one in East 
Asia and might be so in other parts of the developing world as well. 
The models developed in the third section demonstrated that an export promotion 
activity that may be socially desirable with market-clearing wages may be socially 
undesirable when wages are set above market-clearing levels. In particular, the gains 
from adopting an export-oriented trade strategy depend in part on the labour market 
regime within which trade policy is chosen. These results have implications for policy: 
a) If the country's labour market regime is immutable — say, because of a politically 
based decision to encourage strong trade unions or because of the belief that 
minimum wages are good in and of themselves — export promotion may cease 
to be socially profitable. Wages in some countries' export sectors are two or 
three times market-clearing levels. Such countries start out at an enormous 
disadvantage in trying to compete successfully in world markets with the OECD 
countries and the newly industrialising economies. If primacy is accorded to 
labour market policy, promoting exports may not be warranted. 
b) If the country's labour market regime is a genuine policy instrument, labour 
market policy should be made in conjunction with trade policy. The two policies 
interact; the optimal trade policy depends On the choice of labour market policy 
and vice versa. 
These models raise an important note of caution for policy makers. The advice 
now so freely dispensed — "develop via exports" — may well suit a country with 
market-determined wages but become quite disastrous otherwise because higher than 
market-clearing wages may adversely affect the ability to export and the social gains 
from exporting. This does not endorse wage repression; it argues for allowing wages 
to be pulled up by increasing competition for workers through export-led growth 
rather than pushing them up prematurely by non-market means. 
Some very difficult transition issues may arise. Consider a country that starts 
with a dualistic wage structure and then seeks to reform its labour market policies in 
an attempt to stimulate economic growth. Although employment opportunities should 
improve and poverty decline throughout the economy once a new equilibrium is 
achieved, these benefits take effect only in the long run. Meanwhile, in the short run, 
individuals working in the favoured segments of the labour market, who stand to lose 
wages, benefits, or job security if reform is undertaken, may constitute a potent political 
force in opposition to the reform programme. 
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One policy response would be to try to buy the support of the potential losers. 
This presents two immediate problems. It may be quite expensive because of the large 
magnitude of the potential losses or, because the losers were relatively advantaged in 
the economy to begin with, it is not at all obvious that they most deserve support. 
Some countries demonstrate an unfortunate tendency to think of "the poor", "the 
vulnerable", and "the losers" as the same people and to design programmes for those 
who scream the loudest, namely the losers. Governments themselves must decide 
which group presents the most compelling case and therefore most deserves the limited 
safety net resources available. 
Notes 
1. The average annual growth rates in real terms between 1976 and 1992 were 8.4 per 
cent in Chinese Taipei, 7.9 per cent in Korea, 7.2 per cent in Hong Kong, and 7.1 per 
cent in Singapore. Asian Development Bank (1993). 
2. To put matters in some perspective, let it be noted that in my own country (the 
United States) over the last 25 years, median real earnings rose by just half a per cent 
a year in the 1970s and then fell by half a per cent per year in the 1980s and 1990s 
(Juhn and Murphy, 1995, Table 1). The US unemployment rate has been inching its 
way down and is now close to 5 per cent. 
3. The phrase is due to Haggard (1994). See also Deyo (1989), World Bank (1993), and 
You (1994). 
4. For example, Fishlow et al. (1994), Krugman (1994), Rodrik (1995), and Young 
(1995). 
5. For reviews of Singapore's wage repression policy in the 1970s and subsequent 
wage correction policy, see Fields and Wan (1989) and Lim (1990). 
6. The crowding model was first developed by Bergmann (1971) to explain why the 
exclusion of blacks from certain occupations led to higher wages of whites in those 
occupations. A consequence of such discriminatory behaviour is that blacks earn 
less in the occupations into which they are crowded, hence the name "crowding 
model". 
7. This seemingly innocuous condition is sometimes forgotten when exporting is 
advocated regardless of profitability. 
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